I am Professor of Philosophy at Loyola Marymount University, where I direct the University Core Curriculum and share leadership (with my beloved colleague Jason Baehr) of the LMU Intellectual Character Initiative.
I work in metaphysics, free will and the philosophy of action, and the philosophy of religion. My published research tends to straddle these areas and look for insight at their points of overlap, as with the problem of evil and the free will defense, the problem of divine hiddenness, and the place of hope, faith, and forgiveness in philosophy and the religious life.
The aim of this chapter is to develop and evaluate a set of intuitive arguments for the claim that there is something essentially incoherent about the idea of forgiving God. Given traditional theistic commitments about the nature of God and plausible accounts of the enabling conditions for forgiveness, we can identify three arguments for the claim that God cannot be a target of forgiveness. Assessing these three arguments reveals some important points about forgiveness itself. This assessment also reveals a set of crucial decision-points for theists who hope to determine whether God can be forgiven.